BOLD AIP Forum Post - https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-bold-permissionless-validation-for-arbitrum/23232

1. Why are the bond sizes so high?

2. How does BOLD disincentivize malicious actors from attacking Arbitrum?

3. In the event of a challenge, what happens to the confiscated funds from malicious actors?

4. Why are honest parties not automatically rewarded with confiscated funds from a malicious actor?

5. Does the bond requirement only mean that whales can validate Arbitrum One?

6. Why is $ARB not the bonding token used in BOLD?

7. Can the required token for the validator be set to $ARB and can network $ETH revenues be distribute for validator incentive?

8. Will the off-chain compute costs be reimbursed? (i.e. the costs for a validator computing the hashes for a challenge)

9. How will BOLD impact Arbitrum Nova?

10. How are honest parties reimbursed for bonding their capital to help secure Arbitrum One?

11. Could you elaborate on the service fee of 3% to 4% APY? Specifically, is the 3% applied to the amount bonded? If that’s the case, the $ETH would be locked and thus unable to be used to generate yield elsewhere. So, which assets are used to generate this yield? Would it involve some $ETH from the Arbitrum bridge?

12. As mentioned in the AIP, there can be only one proposer at any given time. How does this affect bonding pool scenarios? Specifically, since the active proposer is refunded but relies on bonds from other pool members, what does the reimbursement mechanism look like?

13. When it comes to viewing the upfront assertion bond (to be a proposer) as the security budget for the chain, is it possible for an attacker to go above the security budget and, if yes, what happens then?

14. How do BoLD-based L3s challenge periods operate, considering the worst-case scenario?

15. There are many costs and rewards and reimbursements to take into account - can you summarize them for us?